Elections We Can Count On
Making State and Local Elections Safe, Secure and Trustworthy
The Civic Way series on state and local elections continues. Below, we outline state and local controls for ensuring electoral integrity and how they might be improved. In our last essay, we reviewed voter ignorance, media’s contributory negligence and the shameful campaign to discredit elections. The author, Bob Melville, is the founder of Civic Way, a nonprofit dedicated to good government, and a management consultant with over 45 years of experience improving government agencies.
Highlights:
Democracy’s fragility demands outstanding election processes—and their continual improvement
We have many election checks and balances, including post-election canvasses, recounts and audits, but, with over 10,000 jurisdictions, we can always do better
Upgrading our voting technology and increasing public oversight remain critical priorities
Expanding impartial, professional election audits will be essential to restoring public trust in elections
The Need for Dependable Elections
Democracy will always be fragile. And it will always face grave threats. Dark money. Partisan plots. Cyberattacks. Lying candidates. Wily operatives. Heedless media. Gullible voters.
This past year, we have watched a wholesale assault on the integrity of our elections (especially the 2020 election). This assault, inspired by bruised egos and naked self-interest, has been a shocking success. It’s bizarre conspiracy theories, baseless allegations and outright lies have landed, convincing many GOP voters that the 2020 presidential election was stolen.
Election experts believe that the 2020 elections were secure and reliable. The Big Lie proponents and many voters believe otherwise. It’s easy to dismiss the fake audits (like Arizona’s Cyber Ninja circus) for the shams they are. However, we should not ignore the underlying issue—making sure that our state and local election processes are reliable and trustworthy.
All who cherish democracy, who believe that fair, honest elections are more important than their candidates, should demand robust election processes and controls. Defend democracy against unwarranted attacks, but also demand continual improvements to election processes.
Our Underrated Post-Election Controls
We know that public faith in election processes is declining, but is this trend really justified? Is there any basis for the attacks on our election systems? Is there room for improvement?
Since 2020, a lot of politicians have been fuming about state and local election fraud. One would think that fraud is rampant. That millions of persons cast ballots illegally. That thousands of election administrators and clerks have done nothing to ensure the integrity of our elections.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Before they became piñatas for cynical hustlers, our election processes were far more sophisticated and secure than most Americans realized. In recent years, public officials from both parties have led much-needed initiatives to make them even more secure. One such initiative involves post-election controls.
While they vary by jurisdiction, most post-election processes are quite thorough. Two of those processes—preliminary reporting and canvassing—are designed to prevent the very kind of fraud we hear so much about. Election experts believe these processes have been very effective.
The first post-election process—preliminary reporting—occurs after polls close. Provisional and absentee ballots are counted and all votes are aggregated by precinct, county and state. To ensure accurate counts, rigorous security controls, such as chain of custody seals, redundant tabulations and paper ballots, are used. Upon completion, preliminary (unofficial) election results are issued.
The second post-election process—canvassing—follows preliminary reporting. It has three stages—local canvass, state canvass and certification. The local canvass (up to four weeks) balances totals, spots discrepancies and affirms precinct results. The state canvass (a few days) tests and aggregates local results into statewide results. After double-checking the results and updating unofficial totals, the state certifies the election results.
The Welcome Assurance of Recounts
Recounts—another post-election process—are more familiar. Recounts may take place before or after certification. They provide an effective tool for addressing discrepancies identified during canvassing and determining the outcome of tight races.
Generally, there are three types of recounts—automatic, requested and ad hoc. Automatic recounts are triggered by close elections (i.e., results within a certain margin). Requested recounts occur when formally sought by a losing candidate or another party. Ad hoc recounts may be ordered by election officials or, for states without requested recount laws, the courts.
Recount rules vary considerably by state. Over 20 states offer automatic recounts for close races (e.g., less than 0.1 percent of total votes cast). In most jurisdictions, automatic recounts must occur within certain times (e.g., 30 days of the election). Automatic recount costs are typically paid by the jurisdiction (not the candidate).
About 40 states allow recounts upon request (e.g., from the losing candidate). Some states conduct recounts at the request of others (e.g., voters or political parties). States don’t necessarily honor every request. Some require a close race or a voter petition. Requested recount costs are paid by the losing candidate or the jurisdiction (if the election is reversed).
Finally, some states (e.g., those lacking formal recount rules) conduct ad hoc recounts. Candidate losing close races may seek recounts through state courts. Election administrators may conduct partial recounts upon discovering problems during the canvassing process. Such recounts instill confidence in the final outcome.
The Indispensable Election Audit
Perhaps no word has been more abused this year than “audit.” The partisan investigations conducted in Arizona and contemplated in other states may be called audits, but they are anything but. Still, while an embarrassing distraction, they do not diminish the need for real audits.
For years, state and local governments have employed three types of audits to assess election processes and verify election results—precinct, risk-limiting and performance audits. Their value is underappreciated.
Precinct audits, usually conducted during the canvassing process, uncover discrepancies and verify results in selected precincts. Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) use accepted statistical sampling procedures to assess the accuracy of all results. Professional audits are invaluable, helping election officials validate the canvassing process or, in the event of major discrepancies, order recounts.
Due to time and resource constraints, most jurisdictions conduct audits after certification. In jurisdictions with longer canvassing periods, often those with extensive vote-by-mail (VBM) programs, there is more time to conduct precinct and risk-limiting audits. However, without sufficient funding, it is still difficult for every jurisdiction to maintain an adequate pre-certification audit program.
Performance audits, which can take place at any time, have a broader purpose. Performance audits focus on assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of election procedures. Conducted frequently enough, they can help answer critical questions. Are security controls, like chain of custody procedures, thorough? Are election workers in compliance? Are ballots adequately secured? Is there sufficient redundancy?
The Risks of Voting Technology
With all of the noise about the 2020 presidential election, the baseless allegations, weird conspiracy theories and grotesque lies, the most serious threat to election integrity has been largely overlooked.
The Mueller report, which has faded from view, deserves another look. It documented grave threats to state and local election systems—phishing, hacking, data theft and misinformation—and several election system vulnerabilities. In addition, the Senate Intelligence Committee has urged states to increase election audits and replace outdated voting systems with systems ensuring a “voter-verified paper trail.”
In 2002, federal lawmakers enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The resulting infusion of federal funds spawned a wave of new voting technology, mostly paperless systems. Without paper ballots (the gold standard for election security), these systems made it hard to validate electronic vote totals. In recent years, jurisdictions have been replacing paperless systems, but some still remain. In 2020, about ten percent of voters used paperless machines, down from about 20 percent in 2016.
Replacing HAVA-era systems hasn’t been a panacea. The new systems aren’t paperless, but they have other weaknesses. Some are vulnerable to hacking and malware. Some have ballot bar codes (QR codes) that deter verification and invite manipulation. Some states allow counties to use incompatible systems.
Another troubling issue is that over 90 percent of new voting systems are sold by three firms (i.e., Dominion Voting Systems, Election Systems and Software and Hart InterCivic). Market consolidation magnifies security concerns and makes it easier to hack our voting systems. Federal election vendor standards and oversight are weak or non-existent. State testing protocols are inconsistent and many are inadequate.
Public officials take this threat seriously. Congress has funded at least $800 million for state and local election technology improvements, mostly for cybersecurity. Many states partner with the Department of Homeland Security and US Election Assistance Commission to coordinate cybersecurity efforts. Most states offer technology assistance to local jurisdictions (e.g., grants and cybersecurity programs).
Strategies for Honest Elections
While some errors are inevitable, and potential fraud always looms, our elections are safe and secure. Still, there are opportunities for enhancing election security. We can’t solve everything that imperils democracy today, but we can begin by improving our election processes, pursuing such strategies as the following:
1. Upgrade voting technology. Increase federal funding. Continue to replace paperless voting machines and QR codes. Install hybrid touch-screen machines that print voter-verifiable paper ballots. Promote public ownership (or at least control) of election systems. Establish federal or regional procurement and implementation assistance centers. Add cybersecurity safeguards for machines, software and databases.
2. Improve election security. Establish national security standards and expand federal oversight. Implement more rigorous public testing of election equipment and stricter security standards for election vendors. Secure critical public election infrastructure, including storage facilities, polling places and vote tabulation sites.
3. Strengthen post-election processes. Develop model canvassing and recount standards. Adopt model canvassing and recount processes. Increase the canvassing period to at least 30 days. Start processing early and mail-in ballots upon receipt (no later than 14 days before election day). Expand recounts (e.g., set automatic recount triggers at 0.25 percent or mandate recounts of at least one percent of all ballots for resolving discrepancies. Delay certification until the right winner is known.
4. Require impartial election audits. Adopt model audit standards (e.g., auditor credentials, chain-of-custody, conflict of interest and transparency). Design a model audit process. Establish nonpartisan state or regional commissions for supervising audit programs. Ban partisan interference. Develop a pre-qualified pool of impartial election audit experts. Make election audits more transparent.
5. Expand audits. Develop a dedicated funding source and increase audit budgets. Adopt an annual election audit schedule. Strengthen and reinforce precinct and RLA audit procedures for all jurisdictions. Increase RLAs or hand recounts of statistically-based samples of all ballots. Develop a coordinated performance audit program with more performance audits.
Our state and local governments—all election agencies—must adopt policies, processes and controls to ensure credible election results. Our goal should not be perfection, but rather prevention—minimizing error and fraud rates—and restoring public trust in our election processes.